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Abstract 
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), I examine the relation 
between workers’ reciprocal attitudes, as measured in 2005 and 2010, and participation 
in work-related training courses in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Theory predicts that 
employers find it more profitable to invest in human capital of workers who have 
positively reciprocal attitudes, because they are more likely to return their employer’s 
kindness with higher effort and/or loyalty. The findings are mixed, depending on the 
survey year. I find that positively reciprocal workers are more likely to participate in 
employer-financed training in 2007, in particular when training is general. Also consistent 
with theoretical expectations, I do not find a relation between workers’ reciprocal 
attitudes and participation in training that is not financed by the employer. However, 
workers’ reciprocal attitudes are not related to training participation in 2013. A possible 
explanation is that employers use training to induce reciprocal feelings in a slack labour 
market only.  
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1. Introduction 
A skilled and knowledgeable workforce is essential for organizational performance. 
Employers may therefore benefit from investing in workers’ human capital, for instance 
by supporting workers to participate in formal training programs. However, employers 
do not always have an incentive to invest, because the profitability of human capital 
investment depends on workers’ behaviour. For example, a well-known theme in the 
literature on training is the problem of hold-up (Becker, 1962, see also Leuven, 2005). 
After the employer paid for a worker’s training, the worker has an improved bargaining 
position, as his productivity is higher than before the training. He may exploit this 
situation by asking for a higher wage, or by moving to a competing firm when the training 
is general. As another example, the returns to training depend on workers’ motivation. 
Training arguably has a larger effect on productivity when workers exert effort to put the 
new skills and knowledge into practice. Employers may therefore find it more profitable 
to invest in some workers than in others, depending on their expected behaviour. Since 
behaviour is, for given material incentives, affected by relatively stable personality traits 
and attitudes (Heckman and Kautz, 2012), we would expect that particular traits and 
attitudes are related to workers’ participation in firm-provided training.2 
In this paper, I study the role of workers’ tendency to positively reciprocate, i.e. the 
tendency to return favours. Employers may find it more profitable to invest in workers 
with positively reciprocal attitudes. One reason is that, to the extent workers perceive 
their employer’s investment in their human capital as kind, workers with reciprocal 
preferences will be inclined to return this favour with higher effort and/or higher loyalty. 
A basic prediction is therefore that workers who are more inclined to reciprocate are more 
likely to participate in vocational training that is financed by the employer. At the same 
time, we would not expect that reciprocal workers are more likely to participate in training 
they finance themselves. Own-financed training clearly does not invoke positively 
reciprocal feelings, and it is likely that there is some substitution of the source of finance: 
when employers are more willing to finance training, workers are less likely to finance it 
themselves. A third prediction is that the relation between positively reciprocal attitudes 
                                                          
2 Examples of traits and attitudes that affect training participation are Big-5 personality traits, locus of 
control (Offerhaus, 2013, Gerards et al. 2014), motivation to learn (Nelen and De Grip, 2009), and time 
preferences (Fouarge et al., 2013). 
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and participation in employer-financed training is stronger when the training is general, 
in the sense that the learned skills are visible and transferable for outside parties, than 
when it is firm-specific. One reason is that reciprocity can alleviate the hold-up problem 
that arises when training is general, as argued by Leuven et al. (2005), but does not arise 
when training is firm-specific. Another reason is that general training is more valuable 
from the worker’s perspective, and therefore more likely to be perceived as kind (Barrett 
and O’Connell, 2001, p. 659).  
I test these predictions using survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP). The 2005 and 2010 waves of the SOEP contain a validated measure of 
individuals’ reciprocal inclination, while retrospective information on training 
participation is collected in 2008 and 2014. This allows me to relate individuals’ 
reciprocal attitude as measured in 2005 and 2010 to training participation in the year 
preceding the 2008 and 2014 waves, respectively. The main finding is that individuals 
with positively reciprocal attitudes are more likely to participate in training in 2007, but 
I find no relation with training participation in 2013. Positively reciprocal workers are 
more likely to participate in employer-financed training in 2007. This relation seems 
stronger when the training is general rather than firm-specific, but this difference is not 
statistically significant and depends on how general training is measured. At the same 
time, positively reciprocal workers are not more likely to participate in training they 
financed themselves, or in training that is only weakly supported by the employer. I do 
not find any relation between positively reciprocal attitudes and participation in 
employer-financed training in 2013.  
A possible explanation for those diverging findings is inspired by the fact that labour 
market circumstances in Germany greatly improved after 2007.3 Employers may provide 
training to build gift-exchange relationships only when the labour market is slack. This 
makes economic sense: employees have a higher valuation of general training when they 
perceive a substantial risk of becoming unemployed. Although somewhat speculative, 
more detailed analysis provides support for this explanation. There is no relation between 
reciprocal attitudes and training in occupations that have relatively good perceived labour 
                                                          
3 For example, unemployment decreased from 8.6% in 2007 to 5.2% in 2013, and the employment rate of 
25-59 years old rose from 78.5% to 82.4% (source: Eurostat).   
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market prospects, neither in 2007 nor in 2013. The relation seems driven by occupations 
with relatively poor perceived labour market prospects, in particular in 2007. 
The paper that is closest related to this study is Leuven et al. (2005). They propose 
workers’ positive reciprocity as a resolution for the hold-up problem, and provide 
empirical support for this idea using Dutch cross-sectional data. They find a positive 
relation between workers’ reciprocal attitudes and participation in employer-supported 
training, and no relation when the training is not financially supported by the employer. 
The main contribution of this study over Leuven et al. (2005) is the richness of the SOEP 
data. The SOEP has more observations at several points in time, contains validated 
measures of reciprocity as well as potentially confounding personality traits,4 and allows 
for distinguishing between firm-specific and general training.  
A second study addressing this topic is Gerards et al. (2014). Using data from a large 
company in the Netherlands, they investigate the relation between workers’ reciprocal 
attitudes and the use of training vouchers provided by their employer.5 They find that 
positively reciprocal workers do not use their vouchers more often, while negatively 
reciprocal workers are less likely to use their vouchers. They find no relation between 
reciprocity and non-voucher training. A possible interpretation is that workers view the 
provision of training vouchers negatively, as the voucher scheme was introduced in the 
midst of the global financial crisis and the company had just gone through a number of 
large-scale reorganizations. Their findings might therefore be specific for the particular 
organization and time period studied.   
Two related papers provide evidence that workers positively reciprocate employer-
financed training. Sauermann (2015) combines data from a randomized field experiment 
conducted in a call-centre with survey data measuring workers’ reciprocal attitude. He 
concludes that workers with positively reciprocal attitudes show a larger productivity 
increase after training. Montizaan et al. (2015) point towards a different reciprocation 
                                                          
4 Englmaier et al. (2016, p. 525) discuss recent empirical evidence on the relation between personality 
traits -as often measured in personality tests- and reciprocal attitudes.  
5 Becker et al. (2013) also investigate reciprocal reactions towards the provision of training vouchers, but 
not in an employment relationship. Training vouchers are provided to survey participants as a reward for 
their survey participation, which is reciprocated with future participation by those who redeem their 
voucher.  
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mechanism. They report a positive association between having access to employer-
provided training and individuals’ expected retirement age. Interestingly, it is the firm’s 
provision of training opportunities rather than individuals’ actual training participation 
that drives this relationship, and this relation is concentrated among individuals who have 
a strong reciprocal orientation. This suggests that workers reciprocate generous training 
policies by postponing retirement.6 My paper complements those studies by addressing 
the question whether reciprocal individuals are generally more likely to participate in 
employer-financed training, as would be expected when employers correctly predict 
workers’ reciprocal tendencies.  
This paper also contributes to a broader literature on the importance of reciprocal 
behaviors in employment relationships. The literature has mainly focused on the question 
whether paying generous wages motivates workers to exert more effort, using both lab 
(see Fehr and Gächter, 2000) and field experiments (see e.g. Gneezy and List, 2006, 
Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2010, Kube et al., 2012, and Esteves-Sorenson, 2017). However, 
as pointed out theoretically by Dur (2009), paying a generous salary may not be the most 
efficient way to induce reciprocal feelings. Instead, employers may find it more efficient 
to give managerial attention to their workers, which may include provision of training 
opportunities.7 This study is one of the few to explore the empirical evidence on this 
particular channel. Interestingly, the finding that the relation between reciprocal attitudes 
and training participation seems to depend on perceptions of the labour market across  
occupations is in the spirit of Dur’s (2009) model: depending on the environment, 
employers choose the most efficient instruments to induce reciprocal feelings.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I derive testable hypotheses and 
discuss the underlying assumptions. In section 3, I discuss the data and define various 
                                                          
6 A number of other papers provide suggestive evidence that training participation induces reciprocal 
reactions. Kampkötter and Marggraf (2012) show that absenteeism and turnover rates are lower after 
training participation. Likewise, studies in Organizational Behaviour report a positive association between 
a positive human resource development climate (HRDC) and measures of employee effort and loyalty, 
such as organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB) and turnover intentions (Mittal et al., 2016, Benjamin, 
2012, Mullen et al., 2006, and Bartlett, 2015). 
7 Based on a survey paper by Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005, p. 881), Dur (2009) defines managerial 
attention as socioemotional resources that “address one’s social and esteem needs (and are often 
symbolic and particularistic).” Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005, p. 881) continue by saying: “Moreover, 
socioemotional outcomes send the message that a person is valued and/or treated with dignity”. Offering 
participation in carefully selected training programs seems to be a good example of the latter. 
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types of training. In section 4, I present the estimation results. Section 5 discusses 
additional analyses to interpret the results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
Reciprocity means that individuals tend to respond in kind: they return favors, but 
take revenge for wrongdoings. The former is referred to as positive reciprocity, while the 
latter is referred to as negative reciprocity. A key assumption in this study is that 
individuals differ in the extent to which they feel inclined to reciprocate, and that this 
inclination can be viewed as a stable trait or preference.8 A second important assumption 
is that employers have a generally accurate assessment of workers’ tendency to 
reciprocate, on which they base their decision to offer training. This is not such a strong 
assumption as it may seem at first sight. First, Stirrat and Perrett (2010), Little et al. 
(2013), Centorrino et al. (2015), and De Neys et al. (2015) show that experimental 
subjects are able to predict reciprocal behaviour in a trust game on the basis of pictures 
and short videos of the trustees. Those findings suggest that employers, who interact with 
their employees on a daily basis, are well able to predict employees’ behaviour.9 Second, 
there is no need to assume that employers know the reciprocal attitude of each individual 
worker and offer training to workers with strong positively reciprocal preferences only. 
Employers can base their training policies on the median or average reciprocal attitude in 
the organization. They do not even need to observe those attitudes: when employees self-
select into workplaces based on their reciprocal attitudes or correlated characteristics, 
employers can rely on their past experiences to decide on training policies. This 
mechanism is reinforced by the use of personality tests to screen employees on traits 
associated with reciprocal behaviour, as argued by Englmaier et al. (2016). 
                                                          
8 See Dohmen et al. (2009) and Falk et al. (2018) for a discussion of predictive validity and (global) 
heterogeneity in reciprocal preferences. See Golsteyn and Schildberg-Hörisch (2017) for a general 
discussion on the stability of personality traits and preferences. 
9 Finan and Schechter (2012) provide field evidence from a different setting. They show that community 
leaders in Paraguay accurately predict reciprocal preferences of villagers, and specifically target reciprocal 
individuals when buying votes for politicians.  
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Economic theory provides several reasons why employers are more likely to train 
positively reciprocal workers. When workers perceive the employer’s investment in their 
human capital as kind, they reciprocate with behaviour that benefits the employer. Leuven 
et al. (2005) emphasize one particular reaction, namely that reciprocal workers do not 
exploit their improved bargaining position (e.g. by asking for a higher wage). However, 
it is easy to think of several other options workers have to reciprocate, such as being more 
loyal or exerting more effort. It is therefore more profitable to train workers who have a 
strong tendency to reciprocate favours. This leads to the first prediction: 
H1: workers with positively reciprocal attitudes are more likely to participate in 
employer-financed training.  
Following the reasoning above, there is no reason to expect that workers with 
reciprocal preferences are more likely to participate in training they financed themselves. 
Clearly, a worker can always decide to participate in a training course when his employer 
is not willing to sponsor the training, but such training participation cannot be perceived 
as a gift and hence does not invoke positively reciprocal feelings. Moreover, it is likely 
that there is substitution of the source of finance: when employers are more willing to 
finance positively reciprocal workers’ training, it must mean that they participate in 
training more often, or that they are less likely to finance training themselves. It is a priori 
unclear to what extent employer-financed training crowds out worker-financed training, 
but we can conservatively predict that: 
H2: workers with positively reciprocal attitudes are not more likely to participate in 
worker-financed training.  
In principle, it is possible that employer’s higher willingness to invest in reciprocal 
workers merely implies a substitution in who finances training. Full substitution, 
however, seems unlikely. As we shall see, the data show that many workers do not 
participate in training at all, while own-financed training is relatively rare. It is therefore 
plausible that at least some of the additional employer-financed training induces workers 
to train who would not have done so otherwise. Hence, a third prediction is: 
H3: workers with positively reciprocal attitudes are more likely to participate in 
training. 
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An important distinction is between general and firm-specific training. A training is 
general when two conditions are met. First, the acquired skills must be transferable, in 
the sense that they are also valuable in other organizations. Second, the training must be 
visible: the worker should be able to prove his participation and credibly communicate 
the value of the training to other employers. General training therefore leads to the hold-
up problem described in the introduction: trained workers have an improved bargaining 
position which they may exploit. As formally shown by Leuven et al. (2005), positively 
reciprocal workers are less inclined to do so, which makes it more attractive to train them 
as compared to self-interested workers. This argument does not apply to firm-specific 
training, since workers cannot credibly threaten to change employer in wage 
renegotiations. Workers’ reciprocal attitudes are therefore less relevant when training is 
firm-specific: 
H4: The relation between workers’ positively reciprocal attitudes and participation 
in employer-financed training is stronger when training is general than when it is firm-
specific.  
A second motivation for this hypothesis is that general training may be perceived as 
more kind than firm-specific training when workers realize that the former is more 
valuable than the latter (Barrett and O’Connell, 2001, p. 659). Employers may therefore 
expect that positively reciprocal workers feel more inclined to reciprocate general training 
than firm-specific training.10  
2.2. Alternative theories 
The key assumption in the theoretical framework outlined above is that workers 
perceive their employer’s training proposals as friendly gifts that deserve to be 
reciprocated. There are arguably situations where this assumption is not applicable. For 
instance, workers may think that the training mainly benefits their employer. However, 
there are alternative theories that yield similar predictions but do not depend on this 
assumption. First, when training provision does not evoke reciprocal feelings, employers 
                                                          
10 To be more precise, the assumption is that workers’ reciprocal reaction is increasing in the perceived 
value of the gift, and that workers with reciprocal preferences are more sensitive to the value of the gift. 
These assumptions hold in a simple model with two types, reciprocal and purely self-interested, but need 
not be true more generally.  
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may still find it more profitable to train reciprocal workers. The reason is that when 
employers establish gift-exchange relationships using other means of exchange (e.g. 
generous wages, informal recognition), reciprocal workers exert more effort than non-
reciprocal workers and are more loyal. Training reciprocal workers is therefore more 
profitable, and in particular when the returns to training are increasing in effort.  
Second, it is important to distinguish between employers’ training policies and 
workers’ decision to participate. Not all workers are motivated to participate in training 
(Fouarge et al., 2013), and workers may decide not to exploit the training opportunities 
they are offered. Training participation can therefore also be seen as an expression of 
employee effort rather than as a gift from the employer. In this view, reciprocal workers 
are more willing to participate in training to return favours they received from their 
employer, provided employers establish gift-exchange relationships via other means. This 
view reverses the role of training in the gift-exchange relationship, and is common in the 
literature on Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB). OCB refers to behaviours that 
benefit the organization but are not contractually enforced. Feelings of reciprocity are 
typically seen as an important driver of OCB: “For example, employees who receive 
personal support from their leaders may wish to reciprocate by expending extra effort in 
the form of citizenship behaviours to help the leader” (Podsakoff et al., 2000, p. 552, see 
also Eisenberger et al., 2001, for similar remarks). George and Jones (1997) identify self-
development as a key dimension of OCB.11 An attractive feature of this explanation is 
that workers do not need to perceive training as a gift. The empirical predictions are 
similar, as reciprocal workers self-select into training, but less specific for different types 
of training.12 
2.3. Negative reciprocity 
                                                          
11 In the words of Podsakoff et al. (2000, p. 525) in their review of the literature on OCB: Self-development 
includes voluntary behaviours employees engage in to improve their knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
According to George and Jones (1997: 155) this might include “seeking out and taking advantage of 
advanced training courses, keeping abreast of the latest developments in one’s field and area, or even 
learning a new set of skills so as to expand the range of one’s contributions to an organization.” 
12 Possibly, reciprocal workers reciprocate by participating in courses that are not fully financed by the 
employer, or in courses that are firm-specific. Note, however, that it is unlikely that we observe the former 
relationship empirically, since employers who are not willing to finance training are also unlikely to 
establish gift-exchange relationships. Unfortunately, the data do not allow me to disentangle the roles of 
employers and workers. 
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The theoretical framework concentrates on positive reciprocity (i.e. the tendency to 
return favors), while reciprocity can also be negative (i.e. the tendency to take revenge 
for wrongdoings). It is natural to concentrate on positive reciprocity, since employers’ 
training provision is valuable for the worker and therefore most likely perceived as kind. 
However, it is also possible to speculate about how negative reciprocity affects training 
participation. Employers may have good reasons not to train negatively reciprocal 
workers. They may expect that negatively reciprocal workers are more likely to become 
demotivated as a result of some labour conflict. This is of course always costly, but 
assuming motivation and skills (training) are complements, it is particularly costly when 
the worker received training. Moreover, negatively reciprocal workers may decline an 
offer to participate in training when labour relations are tense, if they believe that by doing 
so they harm their employer (as argued by Gerards et al., 2014). Based on this reasoning, 
we would expect that negatively reciprocal workers are less likely to participate in 
training. However, it is also possible to come up with opposite predictions. As negatively 
reciprocal behaviour is potentially very costly, employers may want to prevent such 
behaviour at any cost, and treat workers with negatively reciprocal attitudes more 
generously. It is therefore not possible to come up with specific predictions.13 In the 
analyses, I use negative reciprocity as control variable, and discuss the empirical 
relationship with training participation.  
3. Data description 
3.1. Reciprocity 
    The data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), in particular the 
waves 2005 and 2008 and the waves 2010 and 2014. Data are collected on the individual 
level and cannot be linked to information on the level of the organization. The 2005 and 
2010 waves of the SOEP contain individual measures of reciprocal orientation, while the 
2008 and 2014 waves contain information on participation in training. Positively 
                                                          
13 Another reason is that employers may very well use other policies to prevent workers from experiencing 
negatively reciprocal feelings. When employers believe those policies are effective, there is no reason to 
expect a relation between workers’ negatively reciprocal attitudes and training participation.  
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reciprocal attitudes are measured by the extent of agreement with three statements, 
expressed on a scale of 1-7: 
1. “If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it”, 
2. “I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before”, 
3. “I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me 
before”  
I use individuals’ average score on those statements as measure of their reciprocal 
tendency. Based on this score, I distinguish between three equally-sized groups (low, 
medium, high) to allow for non-linear effects in the analyses. Perugini et al. (2003) and 
Falk et al. (2016) validate this measure, while Dohmen et al. (2009) and Falk et al. (2018) 
discuss the distribution of reciprocal preferences and their correlates in Germany and 
across the globe, respectively. Negative reciprocity is measured using similar statements, 
specifically:14 
1. “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her” 
2. “If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back” 
3. “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter 
what the cost” 
Although the effect of negative reciprocity on training participation is not the main 
question of this study, it is interesting to observe the empirical relationship.15 I relate 
reciprocal attitudes as measured in 2005 (2010) to training participation in 2007 (2013), 
respectively. Note that individuals express their reciprocal preferences before the time 
period over which training participation is measured, which reduces concerns of reverse 
causality. 
3.2. Training 
                                                          
14 In 2010, additional questions were asked to measure negative reciprocity, such as: “I get over it 
relatively quickly when someone hurts my feelings” and “When somebody has wronged me I often think 
about it for quite a while”. I do not include those additional indicators in the measure of negative 
reciprocity to maintain comparability. 
15 From an ex-ante perspective, it is also important to include negative reciprocity as a control variable. 
As it turns out, the correlation between positive and negative reciprocity is essentially zero, which rules 
out multicollinearity concerns.  
11 
 
The 2008 and 2014 waves of the SOEP include information on individuals’ training 
participation, but different questions were asked in each wave. The main difference is 
that in 2008, subjects were asked to provide information on three courses they followed 
during the last three years, while in 2014 subjects were asked to provide information on 
the most important course they took in the preceding year. Another important difference 
is that different information on each training course is collected. Both waves inquire 
about who financed the training (in terms of time and money), but information on 
whether the training is general is collected in 2008 only. General training requires that 
the worker can prove his participation to other employers and that the acquired skills are 
sufficiently transferable. The 2008 wave of the SOEP collects this information by asking 
individuals whether they received a “participation certificate which they would include 
in job applications in the future”, and how they assess “to what extent the newly acquired 
skills would be useful in a new job in a different company”.   
To make the analyses of the 2008 and 2014 waves comparable, I confine the analysis 
of the 2008 wave to the most recent training completed since 01-01-2007.16 Based on 
who financed the course, I define the following mutually exclusive categories of training: 
1. Worker-financed training: the employer does not contribute financially, and 
the course took place outside working hours. 
2. Employer-supported training: the employer either contributes financially, or 
allows the course to take place at least partially during work time, but does not 
do both. 
3. Employer-financed training: the employer pays all of the direct training costs, 
and allows the course to take place at least partially during work time.17 
                                                          
16I refer to training participation after 01-01-2007 as training in 2007, although this includes training 
participation during the first months of 2008 as well. Likewise, I refer to training as measured in the 2014 
wave as training participation in 2013. Although the question asks for training participation during the 
preceding year, it is not clear whether respondents interpret this as the calendar year or the 12 months 
preceding the survey. The descriptive statistics show that the rate of training participation is comparable 
in both waves. Including training courses that took place before 2007 does not affect the main results.   
17 In 2008, individuals were not asked whether the employer paid all (or part) of the costs. Rather, 
individuals indicate whether they contributed themselves, and whether they received financial support 
from their employer. It is reasonable to assume that when a worker did not pay anything and received 
financial support from his employer, all of the direct costs are paid for by the employer. 
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It is also important to distinguish between general and firm-specific training. 
Therefore, I further decompose employer-financed training in 2007 by the extent to which 
the training is general:  
1. Firm-specific training: the training does not come with a certificate, and the 
worker deems the newly acquired skills "to a limited extent" or "not at all" 
useful in a new job in a different company. 
2. Visible or transferable training: the training either comes with a certificate, or 
the worker considers the newly acquired skills "to a large extent" or 
"completely" useful in a new job or a different company (but not both). 
3. General training: the training comes with a certificate, and the worker deems 
the newly acquired skills "to a large extent" or "completely" useful in a new 
job or a different company. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides an overview of the (relative) frequency of the different types of 
training in the estimation sample. Approximately one third of workers participated in a 
training course, both in 2007 and 2013. In most cases, employers pay for the direct costs 
of training and allow the training to take place during work time. Workers bear the full 
costs of training in roughly one out of ten cases only. Although the rank-order distribution 
of different types of training is identical in 2007 and 2013, it seems that employers’ 
willingness to finance training has increased over time. In 2007, only 61% of trainings 
were financed by the employer, while six years later 75% was classified as such. Most 
employer-financed training courses in 2007 are at least partly general, while firm-specific 
training is rare (only 12%).18   
The estimation sample consists of all individuals who have a regular paid job. I 
exclude trainees, self-employed, farmers, military, students, and job-creation measure 
jobs. I also exclude individuals who switched jobs during the period training participation 
is measured. The reason is that reciprocal attitudes can be expected to be less relevant for 
this group of workers. Firstly, because trainings offered to those workers are most likely 
                                                          
18 The classification of training as general or firm-specific is not significantly different (at the 10% level) 
when training is not financed by the employer. 
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introductory trainings required to do the job, and are therefore offered regardless of 
reciprocal attitude.19 Secondly, because it may take time for employers to learn about 
workers’ reciprocal attitudes and to build gift-exchange relationships. It should be noted 
that, despite those concerns, the results are robust to the inclusion of job switchers. The 
exact number of individuals included in the analyses is lower than the numbers reported 
in Table 1, because not all individuals report information on all control variables. In each 
estimation table, I ensure that the sample is held constant when adding control variables. 
  
4. Analysis and Results 
4.1. Main analysis 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, I examine whether positively reciprocal 
workers are generally more likely to participate in training (H3). Then, I take a closer 
look at this relation by distinguishing between different types of training (H1, H2, and 
H4). Section 4.2 explores the robustness of the results and their interpretation. 
4.1.1. Training participation 
To examine the relation between workers’ reciprocal attitude and their training 
participation, I estimate probit models where the dependent variable is 1 if the worker 
participated in training during the last year and 0 otherwise. Table 2 shows the estimation 
results of different model specifications by survey wave. All specifications control for 
demographic characteristics, month of interview, and personality characteristics.20 
Columns 1 to 3 report the estimated average marginal effects for 2007, while columns 4 
to 6 report the same relations for 2013.  
The results in column 1 show that positively reciprocal workers (as measured in 
2005) are more likely to participate in training over the course of 2007: workers who have 
                                                          
19 Roughly 20% of job switchers who participated in training indicate that the purpose of the most recent 
training was an introduction to a new job, against only 3% in the estimation sample. This number is low 
in absolute sense, but other training purposes can also be seen as necessary training for a new job, such 
as “qualification for professional advancement” when the new job implies a promotion.  
20 Demographic characteristics include: gender, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, contractual 
hours, temporary contract, number of children, having a partner, whether the individual ever experienced 
more than 6 months of unemployment, and nationality. Personality characteristics are: Big-5 personality 
traits, risk and time preferences, and trust.   
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medium or highly reciprocal attitudes have a 3.6 percentage points higher probability of 
participating in training than workers at the bottom of the preference distribution. In 
column 2, I add dummies for education (8 categories) and occupational status (13 
categories plus an indicator for civil servant). The estimated model reported in column 3 
additionally controls for firm characteristics: industry (7 categories), firm size (6 
categories), and workplace location (dummy for location in former DDR). The inclusion 
of additional controls hardly affects the estimated effect of positively reciprocal attitudes: 
the tertile most reciprocal workers are roughly 4 percentage points more likely to 
participate in training than the bottom tertile. Negatively reciprocal workers are less likely 
to participate in training, but this relation vanishes once controlling for education and 
occupational status. 
    Similar analyses on training participation in 2013 paint a different picture. There 
is no statistically significant relation between positively reciprocal attitudes (as measured 
in 2010) and training participation in 2013. It is unlikely that this is an artefact of the 
smaller sample size: the point estimates are close to zero, while the standard errors are of 
the same magnitude as in 2007. The estimated effects of negative reciprocity follow the 
same pattern as in 2007: there is no relation after controlling for education and 
occupational status.  
4.1.2. Source of finance 
As discussed in the previous section, we would expect that the relation between 
workers’ reciprocal attitudes and training participation strongly depends on how the 
training is financed. I distinguish between four possible training outcomes: no training 
participation, participation in worker-financed training, participation in employer-
supported training, and participation in employer-financed training. To investigate how 
individuals’ reciprocal attitudes influence the probability on each outcome, I estimate a 
multinomial logit model controlling for demographic characteristics, personality traits, 
and education.21 Table 3 reports the estimated average marginal effects. Coefficients can 
                                                          
21 In all multinomial logit models reported in the paper, I include the same control variables. Education is 
controlled for by including a dummy for obtaining a degree in tertiary education. The estimated 
coefficients of positive reciprocity remain similar when controlling more extensively for education, 
occupational status and workplace location. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include those controls in 
all analyses due to the limited sample size in some of them.  
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therefore be interpreted as the average change in probability expressed in percentage 
points.22   
The results in columns 1 to 4 of Table 3 show that reciprocal workers’ higher training 
participation is entirely driven by training that is financed by the employer. Workers who 
belong to the top tertile of the positive reciprocity distribution are almost five percentage 
points more likely to participate in employer-financed training as compared to the bottom 
tertile. At the same time, they are not more likely to participate in training that they fully 
or partially financed themselves. The difference in odds ratios between employer-
financed and worker-financed training is also statistically significant at the one percent 
level. This finding is consistent with the idea that employers find it more profitable to 
train workers with positively reciprocal attitudes. As for negative reciprocity, it seems 
that employers are somewhat reluctant to invest in workers with negatively reciprocal 
attitudes. Workers with strong negatively reciprocal attitudes are 3.6 percent less likely 
to participate in employer-financed training. Unreported analyses show, however, that 
this relation becomes marginally significant (p=0.14) when controlling more extensively 
for education and for occupational status. 
The estimation results for training participation in 2013 are reported in columns 5-8 
of Table 3. Although the results in Table 2 show that positively reciprocal workers are 
not more likely to participate in training, it could be that there is substitution in who 
finances the training. The empirical evidence does not support this possibility. Positively 
reciprocal workers are not more likely to participate in employer-financed training. The 
estimated average marginal effects are very close to zero and far from statistically 
significant. This does not change when different training categories are combined into 
one, for instance by pooling employer-supported and employer-financed training. So, I 
find no evidence for a relationship between positively reciprocal attitudes and 
participation in training in 2013, regardless of who financed this training. The pattern for 
negative reciprocity is the same as in 2007: a negative relation which is sensitive to 
controlling for education.    
                                                          
22 Note that since the four outcome categories are mutually exclusive, a higher probability on one 
outcome implies a lower probability on another outcome, so that the estimated coefficients sum to zero 
over the four categories. 
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4.1.3. Visibility and transferability of training   
Next, I investigate the importance of the extent to which the training is general. I 
extend the multinomial logit model by decomposing employer-financed training into 
three categories: firm-specific, visible or transferable, and general. The estimation results 
are reported in Table 4, in particular columns 4 to 6. The results suggest that the relation 
between reciprocal attitudes and participation in employer-financed training is mainly 
driven by training that is at least to some degree general. Workers who are in the top 
tertile of the positive reciprocity distribution are 2.3 percentage points more likely to 
participate in employer-financed training that is general than workers who belong to the 
bottom tertile (see column 6). At the same time, they are not significantly more likely to 
participate in employer-financed training that is firm-specific. The estimated effect, 
reported in column 4, is very close to zero. The difference between firm-specific and 
general employer-financed training expressed in odds ratios is not statistically significant 
(p=0.19), however. This suggests that, although the point estimates are consistent with 
hypothesis H4, we should be careful not to overinterpret this result.  
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
This section assesses the robustness of the findings reported above. I first examine 
the robustness of the findings for alternative definitions of firm-specific or general 
training. Next, I investigate the issue of reverse causality.  
The extent to which a training course is general is defined by the combination of 
workers’ subjective assessment of the value of the training in other firms, and whether 
the training comes with a certificate. One could be worried that the results are sensitive 
to this definition. Therefore, I redid the analyses using other definitions of general 
training. First, I investigate the importance of each of the two elements in the definition 
of general training: visibility and transferability. The results (unreported) are the same, 
regardless whether I use the provision of a certificate or the worker’s subjective 
assessment to classify training as general. 
An alternative approach to define training as general is to distinguish between 
institutions that provide the training. It is clear that training is visible and transferable 
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when it is provided by a formal educational institution or professional organization, while 
training provided by the employer or other institutions is arguably more specific. The 
estimation results using this classification method are reported in Table A1 in the 
appendix.23 Positively reciprocal workers are significantly more likely to participate in 
employer-financed training that is general, while the same is true for trainings provided 
by the company or other institutions. Although this result is not inconsistent with H4, it 
suggests that transferability and visibility are not crucially important. 
All analyses above assume that, to the extent the observed correlations have a causal 
interpretation, the direction of causality goes from reciprocal preferences to training 
participation. This seems a reasonable assumption, as reciprocal preferences are measured 
at least 1.5 years before training participation. However, reverse causality is still possible 
if firms’ training policies are serially correlated over time. To examine this issue in more 
detail, I control for participation in training in the previous survey wave that contains 
information on training. Specifically, I control for having participated in training financed 
by the employer, supported by the employer, or financed by the worker as measured in 
2004 and 2008. The estimation results are reported in Table A2 in the appendix. The 
estimated coefficients are hardly affected by the inclusion of previous training 
participation. Reverse causality is therefore not a likely explanation for the observed 
correlations. 
 
5. Why do findings differ between 2007 and 2013? 
5.1. Possible explanations 
The findings reported above suggest that training participation in 2007 is related to 
positive reciprocity in ways largely consistent with theoretical expectations, but no such 
relationship can be found in 2013. How to explain those diverging findings? In this 
section, I investigate three possible explanations. 
                                                          
23 Using this definition, 24% of employer-financed trainings are classified as general, as compared to 50% 
in the original definition. 
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 As a starting point, it is instructive to exploit the panel dimension of the data to 
conduct the analyses on the exact same individuals in both survey years. This rules out 
that findings diverge because of differences in sample composition or in sample size.24 
Because of the loss of observations (2073 individuals remaining), it is not possible to 
repeat the analysis with the detailed distinction between training categories as in the main 
analysis. I therefore distinguish between: a) no training participation, b) training that is 
worker financed or partially financed by the employer, c) training that is fully financed 
by the employer. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5. The results are 
consistent with those of the main analysis: the tertile most positively reciprocal workers 
are significantly more likely to participate in employer-financed training in 2007, but not 
in 2013. The diverging findings can therefore not simply be attributed to selection of a 
different sample.  
A second explanation is that the sample has aged over time. There are several reasons 
why the relation between reciprocity and training could be moderated by age and/or 
labour market experience. For example, older workers may have a more difficult labour 
market position, which makes it less likely that they exploit an improved bargaining 
position. Reciprocal attitudes may be irrelevant in such a case.25 To address this concern, 
I split the original sample into three age categories: below 40 years, between 40 and 50 
years, between 50 and 65 years. The results of this analysis are reported in Table A3. No 
clear pattern emerges. If anything, the relation weakens with age: positive reciprocity is 
not significantly related to employer-financed training participation in 2007 among 
workers aged above 50. However, unreported analyses show that the interactions between 
positive reciprocity and the three age groups are far from statistically significant for the 
average person. Moreover, as can be seen from Table A3, positive reciprocity is not 
significantly related to employer-financed training participation in 2013 in any of the age 
categories. It is therefore not plausible that panel ageing is confounding the analysis. 
                                                          
24 Although the sample is kept constant, the same individuals do not necessarily have the same 
employer six years later: roughly 13% switched employer. The results are robust to their exclusion from 
the sample. 
25 Another example is that the marginal impact of training on workers’ productivity may be lower for more 
experienced workers, so that their bargaining position hardly improves. Zwick (2015) shows that, indeed, 
older workers benefit less from training. An example why the importance of reciprocity could also be 
increasing with age is that older workers have higher valuation of training, as employers are generally less 
inclined to invest in older workers (Bassanini et al., 2007).  
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A natural explanation why the findings differ between both survey waves is that the 
circumstances have changed. In 2013, despite a global economic crisis, labour market 
prospects in Germany were much better than in 2007. According to Eurostat statistics, 
average unemployment among 20-64 years old dropped from 8.6% in 2007 to 5.2% in 
2013, while the employment rate of 25-59 years old rose by 3.9 percentage points over 
the same time period. To examine the role of labour market circumstances in more detail, 
I split the sample based on occupational differences in perceived labour market prospects. 
Perceptions of labour market prospects are arguably more relevant than objective 
conditions, because the perceptions drive behaviour. They are measured with the 
following question: “If you were currently looking for a new job: Is it or would it be easy, 
difficult, or almost impossible to find an appropriate position?” I take the average 
response by occupation on the ISCO 2-digit level and by survey year as indicator of 
perceived labour market conditions in a particular occupation.26 
I redo the analysis for occupations with relatively good and bad perceived labour 
market conditions.  The results are reported in Table 6. The upper panel shows estimation 
results for occupations with relatively good perceived labour market prospects, the lower 
panel for occupations with relatively bad perceived labour market prospects. The cut-off 
point is the median. It is clear that the positive relation between positively reciprocal 
attitudes and participation in employer-financed training in 2007 is mainly driven by 
occupations with poor perceived labour market prospects. The estimated average 
marginal effects are statistically significant at the one percent level and more than twice 
as large as in occupations with good perceived labour market prospects. The differences 
between occupations with good and bad perceived labour market prospects, however, are 
not generally statistically significant. A similar pattern can be observed in 2013, although 
only the intermediate tertile and not the top tertile of positively reciprocal workers is 
significantly more likely to participate in employer-financed training. Taken together, 
although the data do not allow for drawing strong conclusions, the pattern is consistent 
                                                          
26 It is reassuring that the responses mirror the overall macroeconomic development outlined above: 
individuals are significantly more positive about their chances of finding an appropriate job in 2013 than 
in 2007. Specifically, in 2007 only 15% of the estimation sample thought that it would be easy to find a 
comparable job, compared to 23% in 2013. 
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with the notion that the relation between reciprocal preferences and training participation 
depends on labour market circumstances.  
5.2. Why do perceived labour market circumstances matter? 
The analysis above raises the question why perceived labour market circumstances 
matter. The most plausible interpretation is that training is viewed as a more valuable gift 
in a slack labour market, while the opportunity costs of providing it are lower. Training 
is therefore a relatively efficient tool to induce feelings of reciprocity (Dur, 2009).27 To 
put this interpretation into context, it is instructive to investigate the relation between 
individuals’ reciprocal attitudes and other labour market outcomes. I therefore relate 
reciprocal attitudes to hours worked, job satisfaction, and income over the time period 
2005-2014. Estimation results are reported in Table A4.  
Consistent with the gift-exchange hypothesis, I find that positively reciprocal 
workers report working more hours relative to their contractual hours. Unreported 
estimations also show that if they work overtime, it is less likely to be compensated.28 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that positively reciprocal workers exert more effort. 
Moreover, positively reciprocal workers consistently report higher job satisfaction. This 
is not because they receive higher wages: positively reciprocal attitudes are only 
positively related to income in 2006 and 2008. From 2009-2014, the estimated effect on 
income is essentially zero and not even close to statistically significant. This suggests that 
the positive association between reciprocal attitudes and income is context-dependent as 
well.29 The overall picture that arises is that employers consistently manage to build gift-
exchange relationships with reciprocal workers: they work harder yet are more satisfied. 
However, the analysis also confirms the idea that employers’ means of exchange are not 
                                                          
27 An alternative interpretation for why labour market circumstances matter is that hold-up problems 
become so acute in a tight labour market that employers no longer dare to rely on reciprocity. Although 
intuitive, it is questionable to what extent hold-up problems drive the relation between reciprocity and 
training. In their review of the literature, Bassanini et al. (2007) point out that employers are generally 
willing to pay for worker’s training. The data used in this study confirm this finding. Recent evidence also 
suggests that trained workers tend to stay longer with their employer (Dietz and Zwick, 2016), and that 
voucher-induced training does not lead to higher job mobility (Hidalgo et al., 2014) and wages (Schwerdt 
et al., 2012, Görlitz and Tamm, 2016). 
28 Zheng (2017) shows that reciprocal workers are more likely to work uncompensated overtime the more 
their wage exceeds their reference wage. She also finds that reciprocal workers report higher job 
satisfaction, although this does not depend on their relative earnings.  
29 See Dohmen et al. (2009) for evidence on this relation using the waves 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
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necessarily monetary or material, and also suggests that the means of exchange are less 
tangible in times of low unemployment.   
6. Concluding Remarks 
Theory predicts that employers are more willing to invest in training of positively 
reciprocal workers. To the extent that a training offer is perceived as kind, reciprocal 
workers will be inclined to return their employer’s kindness with higher effort and loyalty. 
This holds in particular for general training, because general training is more valuable 
and therefore more likely to induce feelings of reciprocity.  
To provide empirical evidence on those predictions, I use data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to relate reciprocal attitudes, as measured in 2005 and 
2010, to training participation in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Consistent with theoretical 
expectations, I find that workers with a strong positively reciprocal orientation are more 
likely to participate in training. This is driven by a higher probability of participating in 
employer-financed training: reciprocal workers are not more likely to participate in 
training that is not financed by their employer. The relation between reciprocal attitudes 
and employer-financed training seems stronger when training is general than when it is 
firm-specific. However, this difference is not statistically significant and sensitive to 
method of measurement.  
Those findings are supportive of the idea that employers find it more profitable to 
train workers who have positively reciprocal preferences, but they are restricted to 
training participation in 2007: there is no relation between positive reciprocity and 
training participation in 2013. As unemployment dropped substantially during this period, 
a possible explanation is that employers do not view the provision of training as an 
efficient way to establish gift-exchange relationships in a tight labour market. The value 
of training for the worker relative to the costs for the employer is higher in a slack labour 
market after all. I find some support for this explanation in the data, as the relation 
between reciprocal attitudes and training seems stronger in occupations with relatively 
weak perceived labour market prospects. Interestingly, from 2009 onwards, positively 
reciprocal workers do not earn higher wages, while they consistently work more hours 
and report higher job satisfaction. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that 
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employers use other means to establish gift-exchange relations in an increasingly tight 
labour market.       
An important limitation of this study is that I cannot distinguish between behaviour 
of the employer and the worker, as I do not have information about the training 
opportunities employers offer to their workers. Future research with data on employers’ 
behaviour could therefore shed further light on the mechanisms. A second avenue for 
future research is the role of the economic environment. The evidence points at the 
possibility that economic circumstances influence the means employers use to build-up 
gift-exchange relationships. This is in the spirit of theoretical work by Dur (2009), but 
further empirical exploration is needed.  
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8. Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  2008 wave 2014 wave 
Observations in sample: 6125 4068 
Participated in training: No Yes No Yes 
  4179  1946  2940  1128  
 (68%) (32%) (72%) (28%) 
Source of finance:         
Financed by worker   255 (13%)    74 (7%) 
Supported by employer   501 (26%)    204 (18%) 
Financed by employer     1190 (61%)     850 (75%) 
Employer financed training, by 
generality:         
Firm-specific training   145 (12%)   
 
Visible or transferable training   444 (37%)   
 
General training   591 (50%)   
 
Incomplete information on generality   10 (1%)     
 
850 (100%) 
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Table 2: Reciprocal attitudes and training participation 
 
Dependent variable: Participated in training, 2007 Participated in training, 2013 
   
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Positive reciprocity: medium 0.035** 0.030* 0.031** 0.022 0.021 0.023 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Positive reciprocity: high 0.037** 0.036** 0.036** 0.017 0.012 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Negative reciprocity: medium -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
negative reciprocity: high -0.056*** -0.024 -0.025 -0.050*** -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Demographic characteristics and 
month of interview yes yes yes Yes Yes Yes 
Big-5, risk and time preferences, trust yes yes yes yes Yes Yes 
Education  no yes yes no yes Yes 
Occupation no yes yes no yes yes 
Industry, firm size and location no no yes no no yes 
Observations 5178 5178 5178 3429 3429 3429 
       
Method: Probit. Coefficients report average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-3 regress training participation in 2007 or early 2008 on reciprocity 
elicited in 2005. Columns 4-6 regress training in 2013 on reciprocity elicited in 2010.  
Demographic characteristics: Gender, age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, contractual hours, temporary contract, 
number of children, having a partner, experienced unemployment for >1/2 year, nationality. 
Education and Occupation: Dummies for education (8 cat.) and occupational status (13 cat.) 
Industry, firm size and location: Dummies for industry (7 cat.), firm size (6 cat.), and location in East or West 
Germany. 
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Table 3: Reciprocal attitudes and source of finance 
 
Method: multinomial logit. Training participation in 2007 Training participation in 2013 
 No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
training 
Employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training 
No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
training 
Employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.041** -0.002 -0.001 0.043*** -0.022 -0.001 0.004 0.019 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.004) (0.008) (0.018) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.037** -0.011 0.001 0.047*** -0.013 0.003 0.003 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.003) (0.008) (0.017) 
Negative reciprocity: medium 0.017 0.000 -0.005 -0.012 0.007 -0.000 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019) (0.003) (0.007) (0.018) 
negative reciprocity: high 0.053*** 0.002 -0.020** -0.036** 0.042** 0.002 -0.008 -0.036** 
  (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.003) (0.008) (0.018) 
Observations 5331 3490 
         
Coefficients report average marginal effects from multinomial logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-4 
relate training participation in 2007 or early 2008 to reciprocity elicited in 2005. Columns 5-7 relate training participation in 2013 to reciprocity elicited in 2010. The 
estimations control for demographic characteristics and a dummy for obtaining a degree in tertiary education. Demographic characteristics include gender, age, age^2, 
tenure, tenure^2, contractual hours, number of children, having a partner, experienced unemployment for >1/2 year, nationality.  
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Table 4: Reciprocal attitudes and transferability of training 
Method: multinomial logit. Training participation in 2007 
 No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
training 
Employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training: 
Employer 
financed 
training: 
Employer 
financed 
training: 
 
 
     Firm 
specific 
Visible or 
transferable General 
    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.041** -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.014 0.025** 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.036** -0.011 0.001 -0.003 0.026*** 0.023** 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) 
Negative reciprocity: medium 0.016 0.000 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
negative reciprocity: high 0.053*** 0.002 -0.020** 0.004 -0.014 -0.025** 
  (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
Observations 5331 
Coefficients report average marginal effects from multinomial logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-5 relate training participation in 2007 or early 2008 to reciprocity elicited in 2005. 
Columns 6-8 relate training participation in 2013 to reciprocity elicited in 2010. The estimations control for demographic 
characteristics (Gender, age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, contractual hours, number of children, having a partner, experienced 
unemployment for >1/2 year, nationality.) and a dummy for obtaining a degree in tertiary education. 
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Table 5: Reciprocal attitudes and training participation: panel sample 
 
Method: multinomial logit. Participated in training in 2007 Participated in training in 2013 
 No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
or 
employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training 
No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
or 
employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training 
 
 
 
    
 
   
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.051* 0.012 0.038 -0.015 -0.008 0.023 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.014) (0.023) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.064** -0.008 0.072*** -0.004 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.012) (0.022) 
Negative reciprocity: medium 0.024 0.010 -0.035 0.009 0.005 -0.014 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.012) (0.022) 
negative reciprocity: high 0.038 -0.002 -0.036 0.052** -0.006 -0.046** 
  (0.027) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.013) (0.023) 
Observations 2073 2073 
       
Coefficients report average marginal effects from multinomial logit estimation.  Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample in the upper (lower) panel is constrained to individuals who (do not) feel 
recognized by their employer. Columns 1-3 relate training participation in 2007 or early 2008 to reciprocal inclinations 
elicited in 2005. Columns 4-6 relate training participation in 2013 to reciprocal inclinations elicited in 2010. The 
estimations control for demographic characteristics and a dummy for a degree in tertiary education. Demographic 
characteristics include gender, age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, contractual hours, number of children, having a partner, 
experienced unemployment for >1/2 year, nationality. 
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Table 6: Reciprocal attitudes and training participation by occupational differences in perceived labour market conditions 
Method: multinomial logit. Training participation in 2007 
 
Training participation in 2013  
 
No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
training 
Employer 
supported 
training 
Employer financed training: No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
training 
Employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training 
 
 
 Firm specific  Visible or transferable General 
  
Occupations with relatively tight labor market Sample: 
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.015 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.019 -0.002 0.005 -0.004 0.012 -0.013 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) (0.012) (0.016) (0.026) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.028 0.005 -0.009 -0.009 0.035*** 0.006 -0.022 0.015 0.013 -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.026) (0.009) (0.015) (0.024) 
Observations 2520 1646 
 
Occupations with relatively slack labor market Sample: 
  
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.066*** -0.004 -0.002 0.009 0.011 0.052*** -0.044* -0.001 -0.002 0.047* 
 (0.023) (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.005) (0.010) (0.024) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.047** -0.024** 0.008 0.001 0.020 0.041*** -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 0.016 
  (0.022) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) (0.025) (0.006) (0.009) (0.023) 
Observations 2809 1843 
           
Coefficients report average marginal effects from multinomial logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample in the upper (lower) panel is 
constrained to individuals who work in an occupation where workers consider it easy (hard) on average to find a comparable job. Columns 1-6 relate training participation in 2007 or early 2008 to 
reciprocity elicited in 2005. Columns 7-10 relate training participation in 2013 to reciprocity elicited in 2010. The estimations control for demographic characteristics and a dummy for having a degree 
in tertiary education. Demographic characteristics include gender, age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, contractual labour hours and education.  
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9. Appendix 
Table A1: Alternative definition of general training 
Method: multinomial logit. Training participation in 2007 
 No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
training 
Employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training: 
Employer financed 
training: 
 
 Provided by formal 
educational 
institution or 
professional 
organization 
    Provided by company or 
other 
institution 
    
    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.041** -0.002 -0.001 0.026** 0.018** 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.037** -0.011 0.001 0.020 0.027*** 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) 
Negative reciprocity: medium 0.016 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.011 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) 
negative reciprocity: high 0.053*** 0.002 -0.020** -0.021 -0.014* 
  (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) 
Observations 5340 
      
Coefficients report mean marginal effects from multinomial logit estimation. The base category is no training participation. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Training participation in 2007 or early 2008 is 
related to reciprocity elicited in 2005. The estimation controls for demographic characteristics and a dummy for having a 
degree in tertiary education. Demographic characteristics include gender, age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, contractual hours, 
number of children, having a partner, experienced unemployment for >1/2 year, nationality) and a dummy for having a 
degree in tertiary education. 
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Table A2: Reciprocal attitudes and training participation correcting for previous training participation 
 
Method: multinomial logit. Training participation in 2007 Training participation in 2013 
 No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
training 
Employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training: 
Employer 
financed 
training: 
Employer 
financed 
training: 
No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed 
training 
Employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training 
 
 
     Firm 
specific 
Visible or 
transferable Transferable 
     
         
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.040** -0.005 -0.002 0.004 0.014 0.028** -0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.009 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.007) (0.010) (0.019) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.030** -0.011* -0.003 -0.004 0.027*** 0.021** -0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.006) (0.010) (0.018) 
Negative reciprocity: medium 0.016 -0.000 -0.005 0.006 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 0.005 0.005 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.006) (0.009) (0.018) 
Negative reciprocity: high 0.045*** 0.002 -0.021** 0.006 -0.013 -0.018* 0.024 0.011 -0.004 -0.031 
  (0.016) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.007) (0.010) (0.019) 
Observations 5126 2832 
           
Coefficients report average marginal effects from multinomial logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-6 relate training participation 
in 2007 or early 2008 to reciprocity elicited in 2005. Columns 7-10 relate training participation in 2013 to reciprocity elicited in 2010. The estimations control for demographic characteristics, a 
dummy for obtaining a degree in tertiary education, and previous training participation. Demographic characteristics include gender, age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, contractual hours, number of 
children, having a partner, experienced unemployment for >1/2 year, nationality. 
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Table A3: Reciprocal attitudes and training participation by age category 
 
Method: multinomial logit. Training participation in 2007 Training participation in 2013 
 
No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed or 
employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training 
No training 
participation 
Worker 
financed or 
employer 
supported 
training 
Employer 
financed 
training  
 
  
  
Sample: Age<40 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.014 -0.016 0.029 -0.060 0.053** 0.007 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.028) (0.044) (0.026) (0.041) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.031 -0.027 0.058** -0.053 0.024 0.029 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.026) (0.041) (0.025) (0.038) 
Observations 1553 716 
Sample: 40≤Age<50 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.034 -0.020 0.054** -0.041 0.001 0.040 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) (0.034) (0.020) (0.032) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.028 -0.013 0.040* -0.002 0.027 -0.025 
  (0.026) (0.018) (0.023) (0.033) (0.017) (0.032) 
Observations 1972 1063 
Sample: Age≥50 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.070** 0.034* 0.036 0.007 -0.010 0.004 
 (0.028) (0.019) (0.025) (0.029) (0.016) (0.027) 
Positive reciprocity: high -0.047* 0.016 0.031 0.000 -0.017 0.017 
  (0.027) (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) (0.015) (0.025) 
Observations 1803 1505 
       
Coefficients report average marginal effects from multinomial logit estimation.  Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-3 relate training participation in 2007 or early 2008 to reciprocal inclinations elicited in 
2005. Columns 4-6 relate training participation in 2013 to reciprocal inclinations elicited in 2010. The estimations control for 
demographic characteristics and a dummy for a degree in tertiary education. Demographic characteristics include gender, age, 
age^2, tenure, tenure^2, contractual hours, number of children, having a partner, experienced unemployment for >1/2 year, 
nationality. 
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Table A4: Reciprocal attitudes and actual hours worked, job satisfaction, and income in different survey years 
Dependent variable:  Actual hours worked 
Variables 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.199 0.073 -0.033 -0.158 -0.052 0.055 0.041 0.224 0.017 0.154 
 (0.145) (0.157) (0.155) (0.161) (0.164) (0.143) (0.151) (0.151) (0.164) (0.158) 
Positive reciprocity: high 0.399*** 0.592*** 0.396*** 0.411*** 0.507*** 0.442*** 0.515*** 0.544*** 0.473*** 0.639*** 
 (0.143) (0.147) (0.148) (0.152) (0.154) (0.142) (0.155) (0.151) (0.157) (0.154) 
Observations 7,641 6,917 7,030 6,359 6,101 7,098 6,122 5,213 5,015 4,681 
                 
Dependent variable Job satisfaction 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Positive reciprocity: medium 0.157*** 0.267*** 0.205*** 0.152** 0.106 0.232*** 0.132** 0.075 0.157** 0.072 
 (0.057) (0.061) (0.058) (0.062) (0.065) (0.060) (0.064) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) 
Positive reciprocity: high 0.290*** 0.371*** 0.247*** 0.210*** 0.229*** 0.308*** 0.173*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.125* 
  (0.054) (0.058) (0.055) (0.059) (0.062) (0.058) (0.061) (0.064) (0.068) (0.068) 
Observations 7,605 6,881 6,996 6,338 6,081 7,031 6,083 5,194 4,995 4,644 
                     
Dependent variable Income 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Positive reciprocity: medium -0.007 0.003 -0.005 0.006 -0.021* 0.005 -0.007 0.005 0.009 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Positive reciprocity: high 0.002 0.022** 0.007 0.027*** 0.011 0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 7,671 6,950 7,064 6,392 6,132 7,129 6,150 5,237 5,049 4,698 
           
Each column reports ols-estimations from a different survey year. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-5 relate outcomes to reciprocal 
inclinations elicited in 2005. Columns 6-10 relate outcomes to reciprocal inclinations elicited in 2010. The estimations control for demographic characteristics  gender, age, age^2, 
tenure, tenure^2, full-time work experience,  full-time work experience^2, part-time work experience,  part-time work experience^2, contractual hours, contractual hours^2, 
number of children, having a partner, experienced unemployment for >1/2 year, nationality, education, occupation, size of firm, industry, state of residence. 
 
